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Copyright and Economic Viability:
Evidence from the Music Industry
Kristelia Garcı́a, James Hicks,* and Justin McCrary

Copyright provides a long term of legal excludability, ostensibly to encourage the production of new creative works. How long this term should last, and the extent to which current law aligns with the economic incentives of copyright owners, has been the subject of
vigorous theoretical debate. We investigate the economic viability of content in a major
content industry—commercial music—using a novel longitudinal dataset of weekly sales
and streaming counts. We find that the typical sound recording has an extremely short
commercial half-life—on the order of months, rather than years or decades—but also see
evidence that subscription streaming services are extending this period of economic viability. Strikingly, though, we find that decay rates are sharp even for blockbuster songs, and
that the patterns persist when we approximate weekly revenue. Although our results do
not provide an estimate of the causal effect of copyright on incentives, they do put bounds
on the problem, suggesting a misalignment between the economic realities of the music
industry and the current life-plus-70 copyright term.

I. Introduction
Creative works are widely understood to have a “non-excludability” problem. Once published, books, songs, television shows, and movies are cheap to copy and share, which in
many cases may limit the rightsholder’s ability to appropriate the value of her work. Economic theory predicts that this will lessen incentives to write, sing, and make films. In
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response, the law provides a limited property right in many kinds of creative work. Copyright provides a narrow and time-limited period of legal excludability, during which the
owner of the right can prevent others from—among other things—copying, performing,
displaying, or making derivatives of her work, and can therefore command above-marginal-cost returns in the marketplace. This policy mechanism prompts a canonical legal
design question: For how long should a copyright last?
The duration of copyright has long been a fraught public policy question.
Although there has been significant academic attention to the topic within both the economics and legal literatures, much of the debate has played out in the political sphere.
After a succession of trade deals,1 legislative extensions,2 and Supreme Court decisions,3
the current U.S. copyright term for most works now subsists for the lifetime of the author
plus an additional 70 years.4 (Corporate works—also known as “works for hire”—have a
slightly different term, but for all intents and purposes enjoy a similar duration of protection.) While the political debate in the United States has tapered in recent years, concern
about term length remains salient in many jurisdictions where it is still an active policy
issue.5 Proponents of longer terms argue that they are essential to incentivize new creations, and that they encourage owners to continue to be good stewards of their works
long after initial release (Landes & Posner 2003). Opponents contend that long terms
vastly over-reward a select few copyright owners and create an unnecessary thicket of conflicting property rights, stifling future creativity (Heller 2010).
Despite this long running debate, relatively little evidence has been introduced
about the economic characteristics of commercial copyrighted works. Yet from a theoretical perspective, this is a key threshold question. As with other intellectual property
(IP) rights, copyright is ostensibly designed to provide a financial incentive to produce
creative works. However, for an individual creator or prospective copyright owner, the
incentive operates only for the period during which its owner expects her work to be viable in the market. This detail prompts several empirical questions, on which there is surprisingly little hard evidence. How long does the typical copyrighted work maintain its
commercial viability? Over what period should a creator, artist, or intermediary
rightsholder expect a return?

1
See, e.g., TRIPS: Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994).
2

See, e.g., Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act (1998) [hereinafter CTEA].

3
See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003), in which the Court upheld the constitutionality of the retroactive
term extensions contained in the CTEA.
4
The Berne Convention, to which most nations are party, provides for a minimum duration of 50 years plus the life
of the author, but signatories are free to set longer terms. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and
Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, as revised in Paris on July 24, 1971 and amended in 1979, Art. 7.
5
In recent years, the United States has used trade agreements as a vehicle to encourage other countries to extend
the durations of IP protection. For example, the United States-Mexico-Canada trade agreement (so-called NAFTA
2.0) will extend Canadian copyright terms from 50 to 70 years plus the life of the author. See, e.g., Geist (2018).
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To shed fresh light on these questions, we use a novel dataset from the commercial
music industry that allows us to track sales and streaming volumes over time. As a particularly IP-intensive industry, music presents an important case study of the relationship
between property rights and economic viability.6 Using our highly granular, longitudinal
dataset, we are able to track the economic lifecycle of a broad mix of individual musical
works over time, ranging from pop smash hits to classical compilations. The results yield
a rich picture of the typical window of appropriability for musical recordings. We find
that most commercial music has a remarkably short “economic half-life”: on average, a
commercially released track loses almost 90 percent of its initial sales volume by the end
of its second year of release. Strikingly, this pattern holds across genres and even for
blockbuster releases, suggesting that the current copyright term is at odds with creative
realities in a key content industry.
In a companion piece, two of us develop the doctrinal implications of our findings
(Garcı́a & McCrary 2019). That paper focuses on the normative implications of a period
of commercial viability that is substantially shorter than the current U.S. copyright term.
In this article, we turn to theory and empirics in more depth. We also introduce several
extensions, exploring the role of “top-selling” albums and the relationship between time
and revenue. We begin in Section II by surveying the theory and literature on intellectual
property terms, as well as copyright in music specifically. In Section III we describe the
data and introduce our empirical approach. In Sections IV and V we present our main
results and several extensions, and conduct robustness and sensitivity checks on our findings. Section VI concludes.

II. Theory and Literature
Identifying the optimal term of copyright has long challenged economists and legislators
alike. The classic utilitarian conception of IP law is a response to a well-known public
goods problem in intellectual work (for canonical early discussion, see Arrow 1962). Creative work is (often) expensive to create but cheap to copy. To address this, IP provides a
limited term of legal excludability, affording the rightsholder an opportunity to recoup
her investment by earning a return above marginal cost in the marketplace during the
exclusive period. The basic model implies that a stronger right will increase the share of
a work’s social value that an owner can appropriate. In theory, then, an increase in the
length of the copyright term will be accompanied by an increase in the creative incentive
that it provides (Varian 2005),7 but there are several important caveats. First, longer
terms are not cost-free: policymakers face a classic “incentive-access” tradeoff (Bracha &

6
In this sense, intensive refers to an industry with an unusually high ratio of IP-derived revenue to general revenue
(Didwania 2018: 237).
7
This article takes the core economic theory as given, but there is an important and growing literature that argues
that creative incentives are much more heterogeneous and complex. For examples, see Buccafusco (2007),
Raustiala and Sprigman (2006), Silbey (2014), and Buccafusco et al. (2014).
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Syed 2014). On the one hand, we may be able to increase a copyright owner’s incentives
by strengthening the right and giving her greater pricing power. On the other hand, by
doing so, we limit consumers’ access to creative works and thus increase deadweight loss.
We may also inhibit follow-on creation by other artists and creators (Scotchmer 2004).
Second, and more relevant to this article, the incentive effect of copyright is neither
boundless nor linear: for most works, we expect diminishing private returns to increases
in intellectual property term length (Nordhaus 1967).
The extent of both the incentive effect and the costs of copyright are, in principle,
empirically testable. On the question of cost, some attention has been paid to the effect
of copyright on the availability and perceived quality of creative work. Exploiting the fact
that works written before 1923 are in the public domain in the United States,
Heald (2008, 2014) finds that copyright status is associated with a significant increase in
the proportion of books that are out of print and functionally unavailable.8 Similarly,
Reimers (2019) uses a regression discontinuity to identify the effect of copyrights on the
price and availability of literature, and concludes that copyright results in higher prices
(and fewer editions) for popular works, and lesser availability among low- and mediumquality works. Reimers draws a mixed picture of the welfare effects of this tradeoff, finding that, in this case, the decrease in consumer surplus from reduced access to lowerquality works was not offset by increased profits for owners of popular books.
Buccafusco and Heald (2013) see a similar result with respect to availability in the
audiobook market. They also show experimentally that copyrighted audiobooks are no
more likely to be perceived by listeners as “high quality” than audiobooks derived from
public-domain works, somewhat contrary to theoretical predictions that copyright owners
will have an incentive to be better stewards of older works. However, the picture is complicated: in the musical context, MacGarvie et al. (2018) show that the expiry of copyright
leads to a doubling of rereleases of the underlying work but has no effect on the availability of the original track on Spotify’s streaming platform.
In the case of follow-on creation, new evidence from economic history suggests that copyright can limit the circulation of knowledge in the scientific community (Biasi & Moser forthcoming). Similarly, in the music industry, Didwania (2018) finds evidence that copyrighted
musical works are sampled at less than half the rate of comparable public-domain tracks.
On the incentive side, there is rather less evidence. In legal scholarship, much of
the literature has focused on IP’s “negative space”—particular industries where innovation appears to flourish despite a lack of formal legal protection (for a recent survey, see
Sprigman 2017). On the direct link between incentives and IP, some experimental work
suggests a mixed picture of the effect, at least in controlled settings (e.g., Buccafusco
et al. 2014). Elsewhere, economists offer historical empirical evidence to suggest that longer copyright terms lead to higher prices (Giorcelli & Moser 2020). In general, however,
credible causal estimates are hampered by the long terms of existing copyrights and the
lack of variation in the global policy environment, which has become increasingly standardized through international treaty-making (Li et al. 2018).

8

Heald (2019) finds similar results in the South African context, where copyright expiry is more recent.
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Our article tackles the incentive side of the equation, but with a slightly different
approach. Rather than attempting to identify the price effect of copyright, we take a step back
and put bounds around the problem. We ask what level of financial incentive is actually provided in a key content industry—and, implicitly, whether the current law is a good fit to that
economic reality. Several authors have tackled the question of depreciation in the music industry. Soloveichik (2013) uses Billboard sales rankings and RIAA time-to-certification data to
infer a depreciation rate for purchased music. In a paper that develops a measure of the “quality” of commercial music, Waldfogel (2012) uses a similar methodological strategy to estimate
depreciation rates for different musical vintages. In addition to the RIAA data, he uses longitudinal information on radio airplay to estimate that tracks receive, on average, 25 percent of
their initial share of radio airtime after 10 years of release. However, because recording artists
and labels are not compensated for plays of sound recordings on terrestrial radio, it is a somewhat indirect proxy for economic value and incentives.9 These studies provide important bounds on the economic performance of music over time, but they use fairly coarse data. With
the dataset we introduce in this article, we are able to take advantage of highly granular sales
and streaming data to more accurately estimate depreciation curves for commercial music.

III. Data and Empirical Approach
Our main data were supplied by Nielsen, a data aggregation company that collates listening
figures from a wide range of industry sources and online platforms. The datasets are twofold. The first contains data for a random sample of albums released between 2008 and
2017. We have 1,200 albums in total, stratified by year of release (120 albums per year). For
each album, we observe weekly counts of song sales and streams, aggregated at the album
level, as well as physical and digital whole-album sales (again weekly). The second dataset is
a random subsample of the first. It contains sales and streaming volumes of each individual
track for 10 percent of the albums contained in Dataset 1. Once again, we observe weekly
sales and streaming counts for each track, from the week of release until the end of 2017.10
We supplement the Nielsen sales data with hand-collected metadata that include
each album’s release date and genre, as well an indicator for whether it was previously
released in some form. In the analyses that follow, we exclude all “previously released”
works (which are primarily compilations and “greatest hits” albums). This leaves us with
916 albums and, at the song level, 1,528 tracks from 105 unique albums.

9
The underlying composition (or musical work) and particular recordings of it are conceptually and legally distinct, and are subject to slightly different rules. When a work is played on terrestrial (AM/FM) radio, the owner of
the musical work receives a share of royalties pursuant to a statutory license, but the owner of the sound recording
does not.
10

Note that our sampling strategy leads to an unbalanced panel. The sample includes albums released throughout
our window: every album is observed only from its entry into the dataset, which could be as early as January
1, 2008 or as late as December 22, 2017. As a result, we have between one and 520 observations for each unit: for
example, we observe the full 520 weeks for an album released on January 1, 2008, but only 26 weeks for an album
released in June 2017.
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A. Descriptives
Our data include a wide variety of recorded music, from hit singles by well-known stars to
compilations of children’s music. The sample includes a representative array of genres,
including rock (35 percent of albums), hip-hop and R&B (14 percent), country (9 percent), pop (7 percent), and others. Mirroring the broader population of music, a small
portion of our data is compilations of previously released works—either greatest hits
albums or multi-artist anthologies such as soundtracks—but the majority are new-release
studio albums.
The distribution of recorded music sales has an extremely long tail, and there is
enormous variation in the overall sales volume both between albums and over time.
Table 1 shows summary statistics across our four outcome variables. At the high end, a
single blockbuster album saw 175 million streams in a single week, but the majority of
our observed weekly counts are quite low.
Significant changes occurred in the industry during our study window. Figure 1
shows industry revenue (rather than volume) by format, which gives a sense of the
decade-long trend. In 2008, sales of downloaded digital music had already overtaken
physical CDs as the dominant format by volume, but CDs remained the largest revenue
stream for the industry. By the early 2010s, downloads overtook CDs in revenue terms,
but streaming quickly caught up. By 2017, paid and ad-supported subscription services
represented by far the most economically important distribution format.
To ensure that we capture these changing dynamics, we begin by analyzing the four
modes of distribution—track sales, track streams, physical album sales, and digital album
sales—separately. Most music in our dataset was offered for sale or download through all
four media, but there are some exceptions—for example, certain releases were only distributed in whole-album format. We therefore exclude any unit from analysis if we do not
observe at least one sale (or stream) through the distribution channel in question.
B. Empirical Strategy
Because our focus is on the duration of commercial viability, we are primarily interested
in the decay rate—the relationship between sales volume and time—which leads to a gen

eral model of the form  y it jx it = f ðx it Þ. yit is the observed sales or streaming volume for
album (or track) i at week t  [0,519]. f(xit) includes functions of time since release. For
the album-level data, we use “weeks since release” and its square root to account for nonlinearity in the relationship.
Table 1:

Summary Statistics for Weekly Sales and Streaming Counts

Digital album sales
Physical album sales
Track sales (by album)
Track streams (by album)

Mean

SD

217
123
1,288
1,497,983

2,469
2,118
8,254
5,781,519

Min.

Median

Max.

0
0
0
0

9
11
76
149,369

507,238
709,178
655,153
176,964,675
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Figure 1: Industry-wide revenue share by sales medium, 2008–2017.

NOTE: Figure data are from the RIAA U.S. Sales Database, available at https://perma.cc/CV8F-XTYQ.

In practice, the album’s release date is a slightly noisy measure because the constituent tracks are sometimes released at different times. Due to the structure of our data,
any track whose unique identifier (a so-called ISRC11) is associated with an album will
contribute to that album’s total “count,” regardless of when a sale or stream occurs. Lead
singles, for example, are often released one to two months in advance of the rest of the
album, which gives rise to “prerelease” counts of sales and streams for the collection. To
maintain consistency across units, we start our analyses at the date on which the album
was released, but in the Appendix we include robustness checks showing that extending
our window back in time does not substantively change our results (Figure A2). For the
track-level data, we can use the release date of each individual song—including those
released prior to the full album—which avoids any truncation problem.

11

An ISRC, or International Standard Recording Code, is a unique identifier assigned to every individual sound
recording (different recordings of the same underlying composition will each have their own unique ISRC). Technically speaking, an album is a collection of these underlying ISRCs, and the total number of album track sales is just
the sales of the collection’s individual ISRCs summed together. In principle, this means there could be some overlap between albums: that is, if a particular sound recording was included on multiple albums, we would “double
count” it. In practice, our window is sufficiently short and our random sample sufficiently small that this is unlikely
to occur. We also find substantively similar results at the level of individual tracks, allaying any concern about the
effect of the aggregation.
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There are several possible options for parametric estimation.12 Since we are
modeling counts, the natural choice is Poisson regression. A simple pooled Poisson
model, yit = exp(xit β), is robust to violations of the customary distributional assumptions.13 The negative binomial (NB2) model is a potential alternative, introducing a
gamma-distributed dispersion parameter to relax the Poisson equidispersion assumption (Cameron & Travedi 1998).14 In practice, though, we suspect that neither of the
pooled estimators correctly models the underlying data, given the unobserved heterogeneity between albums. The between-album differences are significant, and they
remain even when controlling for year of release (and, later, RIAA certification). The
fixed effects Poisson estimator (FEP) introduced by Hausman et al. (1984) allows us
to include album-level individual effects in a computationally tractable way, using
within-album variation to estimate the average decay rate, such that yit = αi exp(xit β),
where αi is an individual effect that functions as an intercept shift.15
In the main text, we present FEP results. As a robustness check, in the Appendix
we repeat our main analysis with the alternative estimators (Appendix Tables A1 and A2).
In short, the results for track sales are insensitive to our choice of model. The results for
track streams are broadly similar for the main specification, and only vary slightly when
we introduce controls for blockbuster status (as described below). We use robust standard errors clustered at the album level to account for correlation over time within each
album (Wooldridge 2002: 675).
Finally, we must account for the dramatic changes in overall use of each format
during our study window. For example, the dramatic rise in subscription music services
means that a recording may be streamed at a greater absolute rate over time, in large part
because more people are using streaming services. Put differently, for any given album or
song, the change over time can be attributed to both the underlying (secular) trends in
the industry, and the variation that is inherent to the recording itself. For our purposes,
we are primarily interested in the second component.
To disentangle the two effects, we use a measure of exposure in order to normalize
the sales and streaming counts over time.16 Ideally, we would adjust each of our observed

12

We also estimated a nonparametric fixed effects Poisson regression using a full set of week dummies in place of
the continuous functions of time. The results are very similar, and we present the more parsimonious parametric
models here.

13

In particular, the Poisson model assumes that the mean and the variance of the outcome are equal, conditional




on covariates,  yit jx it =  y it jx it . This does not hold in our data: across all distribution channels, the conditional
variance is generally (much) larger than the conditional mean—a characteristic known as over-dispersion. This
problem is common in applied settings, and the Poisson estimator is robust to violations. Our estimator is consistent so long as we correctly specify the conditional expectation function itself. (This is known as the quasimaximum likelihood interpretation [Wooldridge 1999].)

14

Our data have an excess of low but nonzero numbers, so we do not consider zero-inflated models.
Note that exp(ηi)exp(xit β) = exp(ηi + xit β).

15

16

We incorporate the exposure variable as an offset in the regression. In Figure A2, we demonstrate the effect of
leaving out the offset.
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Table 2:

Population Volumes for Each Medium (Millions)

Year

Track Streams

Track Sales

Digital Albums

Physical Albums

2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2013
2014
2014
2015
2015
2016
2016
2017
2017

—
—
—
—
—
53,050
53,050
82,250
82,250
131,600
178,500
208,700
223,600
284,700
333,400

1,000
1,100
1,200
1,300
1,400
707.4
621.4
649.8
550.8
558.8
436.9
412.8
330.9
306.9
247.2

63.6
74.6
85.8
104.0
116.8
61.3
56.7
54.7
62.9
56.4
52.9
48.2
36.9
35.8
30.6

371.4
300.2
257.2
246.4
205.2
78.3
103.3
63.3
92.7
53.0
83.8
45.8
66.6
42.2
61.1

H1
H2
H1
H2
H1
H2
H1
H2
H1
H2

NOTES: For years 2013–-2017, half-yearly data are taken from RIAA’s semi-annual reports. From years prior to 2013,
yearly data are taken from RIAA sales data website, available at https://perma.cc/CV8F-XTYQ.

counts by the sum of all sales or streams in that week. Unfortunately, we have the aggregated data only in yearly (or sometimes half-yearly) increments, as shown in Table 2. We
therefore approximate the total weekly streams by assuming that they are distributed uniformly within each aggregate group: that is, we simply divide the total by 52 (or 26 in the
case of half-years).17 Of course, this measure is not perfect—for example, we know that
overall streaming is, in practice, increasing month-on-month during our study window—
but it provides a reasonable approximation.

IV. Main Results
A. Sales
Table 3 presents the first part of our main results: estimates for sales rates across four different media. Columns (1) and (2) show physical and digital album sales. Columns
(3) and (4) show track sales, aggregated at the album level and individually, respectively.
(Note that unlike ordinary linear regression, Poisson coefficient estimates are semi-elasticities, which require a little more work to interpret—specifically, a one-unit change in x
is associated with percentage change in the outcome.) Whole-album sales (Columns
(1) and (2)) show particularly steep declines in appropriability: average sales decrease to
less than 5 percent of their initial peak only months after release and are negligible
beyond the first year. As we might expect, sales of individual songs—including both

17

For example, in the first half of 2015, there were 131.6 billion unique streams. For each week, therefore, our
measure assumes 131.6/26 = 5.06 billion total streams.
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Estimates for Sales Depreciation (Fixed Effect Poisson)

Weeks since release
sqrt(Weeks since release)
Observations

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Physical Albums

Digital Albums

Track Sales
(Album Level)

Track Sales
(Song Level)

0.018 (16.5)
−0.65 (−25.91)

0.025 (16.0)
−0.69 (−19.05)

0.0058 (6.3)
−0.30 (−12.84)

0.0005 (0.4)
−0.22 (−6.22)

219,282

222,311

211,705

388,926

NOTE: z-statistics in parentheses; standard errors clustered at the album level; includes album fixed effects. All
models include the (logged) weekly population total of the respective sales medium, as an offset.

physical singles and digital track purchases—have a longer period of economic viability.
On average, track sales volume declines to only 20 percent of its initial peak after one
year of release, and slowly declines to a negligible volume through the remainder of our
10-year study window.
To demonstrate these relationships visually, we plot predicted decay rates from the
models in Figure 2.18 The bottom two panels compare album-level and song-level track
sales, while the top two panels show results for whole-album purchases. We observe a
somewhat longer shelf-life for sales of constituent tracks than we do for entire albums,19
but the top-line results show a steep decline in the average sales performance of sound
recordings, regardless of the distribution method.

B. Streaming
Of course, direct sales are only one part of the modern music economy—and, in practice,
they are an increasingly small one. The rise of subscription streaming services (Spotify,
Google Play, Apple Music, etc.) appears likely to signal a qualitative shift in how listeners
consume, and pay, for music. Although Spotify was founded in 2006 (and entered the
U.S. market in 2008), it did not become commercially significant until the early 2010s.
Indeed, some of the most popular modern subscription services are a relatively recent
phenomenon: Apple Music and Google Play began operating in 2015, and Amazon Music
in 2016. Unfortunately, this implies a limitation of our analysis. To be conservative, we
take only 2015, 2016, and 2017 as “complete” streaming years, leaving a somewhat small

18

Uncertainty estimates are generated with a percentile block bootstrap (resampling on albums) at the 95 percent
level.

19

The continuing shift in purchasing patterns away from albums and toward individual tracks has interesting implications for the (in)efficiency of bundling. Specifically, it suggests that consumers respond differently when they
are not constrained to buy preset bundles of songs (i.e., albums). Our data provide some evidence of this general
change: over the full sample, the top 25 percent of albums account for 83 percent of CD sales, but the same fraction of albums accounts for almost 93 percent of individual track sales.
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Figure 2: Depreciation of sales volume.

number of observations—just 314 albums, with up to 154 weeks of data per album. This
hinders our ability to make statistical inference. More importantly, this feature of the data
betrays a deeper substantive problem: streaming simply has not been around very long,
and it is too early to make any confident assessment of its economic significance. Still, we
can offer some tentative initial observations.
In line with the sales results, streaming track plays decline monotonically over time,
but as Figure 3 suggests, streaming appears to follow a slightly different trajectory from
that of sales. Volumes fall more gently in the first year—albums retain, on average,
around 25 percent of their initial volume a year after release. Over the medium term,
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Depreciation of track streams, aggregated by album (2015–2017).

average streaming volumes begin to flatten out, settling at just below 20 percent of the
initial volume. Although our study window is too short to tell the full story, this offers suggestive evidence that streaming presages a change in the economic lifespan of commercial music. On the other hand, it may be that listeners are actually consuming music in
much the same way as before, but that we cannot observe it. Note that on a streaming
platform we count every listen, but that for sales we observe only the first purchase of an
album or digital download.20 Without evidence on private consumption, it is difficult to
disentangle these explanations. However, from the perspective of artist or record label
incentives—the focus of this article—the effect of these changes on revenue streams is
the most salient issue; we discuss this further below.
Finally, given that our sales models use the full 10-year period, one might be concerned that we are making an apples-to-oranges comparison; that is, that the streaming
results are simply an artifact of the period studied, rather than a consequence of substantive differences between the two distribution channels. To check this, Figure A1 in the
Appendix compares sales depreciation rates estimated using data for (a) the whole window (as above), and (b) only the 2015–2017 window. The curves track each other closely,
suggesting that the streaming differences are indeed attributable to effects of the
medium.

20

We thank Will Page, former Chief Economist at Spotify, for this point.
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V. Extensions
A. Top Sellers
Thus far we have focused on the average performance over all works. In practice, however, the commercial music industry is known to have a very long tail. The majority of
recorded music does not produce a significant return, while a small number of artists
(and tracks) are extraordinarily successful (e.g., Barnett 2014: 398). Indeed, we observe
precisely this pattern in our data. From a policy perspective, it is important to be attentive
to this kind of cross-subsidization. If the industry is organized in such a way that record
labels focus on blockbuster releases, then estimates of “average” economic half-life may
mask consequential differences in the incentive structure of the industry (DiCola 2013;
Rosen 1981; Elberse & Oberholzer-Gee 2007). How, then, does economic viability differ
for the music aristocracy?
There are two (potentially complementary) ways that a work could be a commercial
success. First, a song could sell for many years—the proverbial Beach Boys or Beatles hit
single. These tracks are often repackaged and rereleased on “greatest hits” albums and
other compilations, in addition to having their original albums actively marketed for
much longer than the typical work. Second, a track could be an early chart-topper, selling
a huge number of units soon after release. Given the limited 10-year window of observation, the structure of our data limits our ability to make inferences about the first mechanism.21 We are, however, able to shed light on the second.
Fortunately, our sample includes multiple Gold-, Platinum-, and Diamond-award
winning albums. Although the official certification is difficult to obtain, the Recording
Industry Association of America (RIAA) is transparent about the criteria used to make
the awards, which allows us to replicate the classifications.22 We impute “top-seller” status
to any album or track that could have received Gold or higher certification under the
RIAA rules.23 This accounts for 13.8 percent of the albums and 6.1 percent of the tracks
in our dataset.24

21

This is an important question that we plan to revisit in future work.

22

The rules are somewhat complex. Album certification is based on “album-equivalent units,” which combine
whole-album sales, track sales, and track streams (the latter two are discounted). Five-hundred-thousand “albumequivalent” units sold constitutes a Gold certification. For predominantly Spanish-language music, Gold certification is awarded at 30,000 units in recognition of the different size of the markets. We adopt the same approach in
our imputed measure. However, a robustness check shows that our results are not sensitive to our decision to
include Spanish-language albums (Appendix Table A3).

23

We also conducted a manual check with the RIAA for albums released toward the end of our dataset, for which
we observe an artificially short time period.

24

Although this proportion may seem somewhat high, we note that our measure is deliberately over-inclusive. We
include any album that passes the RIAA threshold, whereas in practice certification is awarded only on application,
and only in certain cases (for example, Gold or Platinum status would not generally be awarded to multi-artist
compilations). Because of this, the actual RIAA certification is somewhat noisy, whereas our “empirical” measure
provides a clear picture of the economic performance of the album.
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Using this indicator variable, we replicate the main specification with an additional
interaction term, which allows top-selling and less popular albums to take on different
rates of decline. Of course, by construction, the two types of music have very different
absolute sales and streaming levels: the average non-blockbuster album sells around
3,000 tracks and streams 500,000 times in its first week of release, while the average blockbuster album sells 45,000 and streams 8.4 million times. However—and crucially for our
purposes—the rates of decline are remarkably similar, closely mirroring our main results.
Figure 4 shows the depreciation rates for track sales (aggregated by album). In both
cases, the albums’ tracks lose more than 80 percent of their initial sales volume by the
end of the first year.
Streaming volumes, shown in Figure 5, tell a similar story. A top-selling work maintains, on average, around 20 percent of its initial streaming volume after 12 months,
while non-certified tracks stream around 30 percent of their opening volume at the same
point. The slightly steeper fall for blockbusters is perhaps not surprising, given the different starting points. As with sales, the streaming depreciation graphs hide a substantial difference in overall volume between blockbusters and non-blockbusters. On average, the
former saw 40 million streams in their first month, while the latter had just 2.3 million.
(On the other hand, the differences are somewhat less marked for album sales—nonblockbusters sold an average of 20,000 digital and physical units in their first month
vs. 125,000 for blockbusters.) All this said, we stress again that the short window of observation and small sample limits our ability to draw conclusions with confidence, and this is
mirrored in the wide uncertainty intervals.
From the perspective of copyright policy, these are important—and perhaps
surprising—results. Even if cross-subsidization is an important reality in the industry,
these findings give little reason to think that copyright should treat blockbusters differently. In the context of duration, at least, the economics of blockbusters and run-of-themill releases do not appear to be so different.

B. Genres
Next, we consider the relationship between depreciation and genre. Figure 6 shows predictions from a model of the six most common genres in our sample: rock, hip-hop, pop,
country, Christian, and Latin music. The model is similar to earlier analysis, with two
adjustments. First, we use a pooled Poisson model, which allows us to predict actual volume, rather than just decay rates. Second, because genres have heterogeneous distribution channels (e.g., rock sells a higher proportion of albums, while hip-hop is a more
streaming-focused genre), we use album-equivalent units as the dependent variable.25
We find the general pattern of decline to be much the same as in the results above,
but there are some notable and intriguing differences across types of music. Hip-hop and
pop exhibit relatively steep depreciation curves, dwindling to a small portion of their

25

This is the same measure introduced in Section V.A. It heavily discounts an individual stream relative to a wholealbum sale to account for the very different revenue that accompanies each.
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Figure 4:
level).

Track sales depreciation for blockbuster albums (aggregated at the album

Figure 5:
level).

Track streaming depreciation for blockbuster albums (aggregated at the album
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Relationship between genre and album-equivalent unit volume depreciation.

NOTE: Predicted outcomes are album-equivalent units, which is a weighted aggregation of sales and streaming
channels. To highlight the difference in absolute levels, this model uses a pooled Poisson estimator, which allows
us to predict counts, rather than just depreciation rates. However, the FEP estimate (omitted for brevity) has similar slope coefficients. Predictions beyond Year 4 of release are excluded for legibility.

initial unit volume by the second year of release—but they also start with substantially
higher rates of absolute popularity. By contrast, country and rock music produce somewhat flatter depreciation curves.26 Country music in particular holds its relative value

26

The commercial success of country music may be somewhat misrepresented here, given that its distribution leans
unusually heavily on radio airtime.
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longer into the window: for example, the model predicts that hip-hop and country music
will have similar unit volume after six months, despite the former starting with triple the
amount at release.
Still, our results and conclusions here are modest. After subsetting, the sample size
for any individual genre is quite small. The direct implications for copyright policy are
also somewhat ambiguous. Copyright is a uniform legal right as to sound recordings, and
different genres of recorded music receive the same formal scope of protection.
Although we argue that our findings militate in favor of a general music copyright term
that is better calibrated to the economics of the industry, micro-targeting of specific genres seems likely to have distortionary effects on music production. For example, a longer
copyright term for country music might induce inefficient overproduction of that genre,
or “gaming” of genre classifications on the part of record labels and artists. (The notion
of gaming the numbers is not novel in the music industry. For example, because the
RIAA sets a lower Gold certification threshold for Latin music than for other genres—
30,000 units vs. 500,000 units—some artists will incorporate a guest artist who may sing
one verse in Spanish in order to classify the track as “Latin.”) Nevertheless, it is intriguing
that the most popular contemporary genres have steeper decay curves. This accords with
anecdotal reports of a general shift in the economics of the industry toward ephemeral
hits, in which more of a work’s commercial value is realized early in its lifecycle.27

C. Revenue
Finally, we consider revenue. Thus far, our analysis has focused on sales (and streaming)
volume, in line with the limitations of our data. (We have access only to streaming and
sales counts, and do not observe revenue directly.) However, given the complex pricing
and payout structures across different distribution channels, it is not necessarily obvious
that revenue would follow the same decay patterns as unit counts. To probe this further,
we construct a synthetic measure of the weekly revenue for each track and album.
To generate our revenue approximation, we assume a per-unit revenue multiplier
for each medium:
revenue = 0:99 × track sales + 0:0005 × track streams + 9:99 × digital albums + 12:99 × physical albums:

In practice, physical revenue varies by album for many reasons—single or double
CD, EP, popularity, idiosyncratic vendor pricing, and so on—and digital prices and payouts vary from platform to platform. For example, Spotify’s average payout is currently
around $0.00437 per stream, while Apple Music’s is $0.00735. (These per-stream payouts
vary further depending on whether they are served to paying or "freemium" consumers.)
The numbers we use reflect broad industry averages, but to confirm that the results are
not sensitive to our specific choice of multipliers, we also report estimates for lower and

27

See, e.g., Cliff (2019).
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Estimates of Weekly Revenue
Bounds

Weeks since release
sqrt (Weeks since release)
Blockbuster (1/0)
Blockbuster × Weeks since release
Blockbuster × sqrt(Weeks since release)
Constant
Observations

(1)

(2)

(3)

Main Results

Minimum

Maximum

0.0179
(24.59)
−0.587
(−37.17)
2.018
(12.89)
−0.00233
(−1.53)
0.0687 (1.93)
11.24 (154.88)
230,109

0.0180
(24.73)
−0.590
(−37.37)
2.013
(12.86)
−0.00221
(−1.45)
0.0670 (1.87)
10.99 (151.68)
230,109

0.0184
(23.80)
−0.592
(−36.30)
2.019
(12.88)
−0.00174
(−1.11)
0.0598 (1.64)
11.50 (157.79)
230,109

NOTE: z-statistics in parentheses; standard errors are clustered at the album level.

upper “bounds” in Table 4.28 Although our measure is a coarse approximation of the
true revenue potential of a given recording, it provides a useful window into the relationship between unit volume and revenue.
To derive the revenue decay curves, we repeat our previous empirical strategy, this
time estimating a pooled Poisson model.29 Once again, we interact blockbuster status
with time to allow the decay curves to differ. Table 4 shows our results, with the key findings reported in Column (1) (Columns (2) and (3) report bounds). In Figure 7, we plot
the expected weekly revenue, as predicted by Column (1).
In line with our earlier results, we find that overall revenue decays remarkably quickly.
Blockbuster albums see an average of $600,000 in revenue in their first week of release, which
falls to $65,000 (11 percent) by the sixth month. As before, the decay curves of the nonblockbuster and top-selling albums follow a remarkably similar trajectory—indeed, the slopes
are statistically indistinguishable.30 However, the initial revenue for top-selling albums is, of
course, much higher. By the end of Year 4, the average non-blockbuster has residual revenue
of roughly $1,000 a week. The average blockbuster—approximately the top 10 percent of our
data by sales volume—commands residual weekly revenue of around $8,000.

28

The “minimum” scenario uses values of $0.69, $0.0004, $7.99, and $9.99; the “maximum” scenario uses $1.29,
$0.0009, $12.99, and $16.99, respectively.

29

Note that although we are no longer modeling counts, the Poisson estimator can be equivalently thought of as a
generalized linear model with a log link function, ½Y jX  = expðX βÞ . Unlike a log-linear OLS regression,
½logðY ÞjX  = X β, the Poisson model can easily accommodate observed values of zero, which are a common feature
of our data.
30

Using a Wald test, we fail to reject the null hypothesis that the slope interaction terms are jointly equal to zero
(p = 0.16).
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Figure 7: Predicted weekly album revenue across all distribution channels.

Finally, in unreported results, we consider the possibility that revenue depreciation
rates are changing over time. Given the change in consumption patterns from physical
CDs to digital streaming, we might suspect that the revenue decay curves would have appreciably changed over the course of our study window. However, we tested a model that interacted
the slope coefficients with year of album release and found no appreciable difference in the
average depreciation rates by stratum. This may be a feature of our (relatively small) dataset,
or it may be that the full consequences of economic shifts in the industry are yet to be
revealed.
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VI. Discussion
Our top-line results show that album and song sales have a remarkably short period of
economic viability. Sales of whole albums (both traditional CDs and digital) approach
zero by the end of their first year of release. Individual tracks maintain meaningful sales
volumes for longer—perhaps up to several years—but average track sales are negligible
in the medium term, and almost zero by the end of our 10-year study period.
We also find indicative evidence that streaming services prolong the life of sound
recordings. Our data suggest that the economic value of the average track declines more
slowly through this medium. (From a revenue perspective, the incentive implications of this
remain unclear, since streaming volume far exceeds sales volume, while per-sale earnings far
exceed per-stream royalties.) Unfortunately, our conclusions about streaming are quite tentative. As a result of the small sample size and limited window of observation, we simply cannot
make confident inferences. This is a clear avenue for further research as the music industry
continues to evolve and further data on consumer behavior becomes available.
There are obvious limitations to our analysis. First, the findings are purely descriptive: nothing in our data allows us to directly assess the causal effect of copyright on sales,
let alone on creators’ or labels’ incentives. The data provide a portrait of the economic
environment faced by the industry, but we cannot directly observe the choices of artists
and record labels.
Second, this is just a piece of the puzzle. Although music is a copyright-intensive
industry, consumer sales and streams are only one component of revenues for commercial
music. Statutory royalties paid to the owners of musical compositions and sound recordings
are not accounted for in our data. Nor are the various contractual income sources—
including sync licensing, touring, and endorsements—that can constitute a significant portion of an artist’s revenues. In many cases, these contractual revenue streams are
influenced by the copyright-related revenue streams. This impact varies, however, from artist to artist, and over the course of a career. Unfortunately, our results cannot reveal much
quantitatively about these ancillary revenue sources because this information is not generally public.31 Nevertheless, we think these data provide a reasonably good proxy for the
overall popularity and revenue performance of the bulk of commercially recorded music.
Our analysis shows that the average work has exhausted its commercial potential
long before the term of copyright protection expires. This might suggest—as we
conclude—an inefficiency owing to overprotection, such that a more carefully calibrated
term would strike a better balance between incentivizing creation and ensuring a robust
public domain. An alternate interpretation might suggest that a work’s lack of commercial value mitigates concerns stemming from overprotection. In other words, if a work is
commercially worthless, what harm is there in that work remaining under copyright

31

One of us has taken a qualitative stab at it, however. In a forthcoming chapter, Garcı́a (2020) interviews a series
of artists and management teams to determine that copyright-derived income sources tend to be important both
early on, and much later, in an artist’s career, whereas contractually derived income plays a significant (and
increasing) role at every stage.
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protection? In a word: access. In the absence of a use requirement, copyright protection
prevents a work from falling into the public domain regardless of whether the
rightsholder is actively exploiting it or making it available. The literature has identified
several categories of post-commercial works for which an extended period of copyright
protection has an adverse impact on access. These include orphan works (works whose
authors are either unknown or unidentifiable); mismanaged works (where a work’s
author is known but deceased, and the stewards are either delinquent or difficult to
trace); and works by disadvantaged or marginalized authors. Works in the latter category,
for example, often do not experience commercial success in their day, but may later
prove to be valuable historical accounts of oppression (Reese 2012: 291).
Overall, we find the sharpness of the results quite striking. Our analysis provides a
baseline for the commercial relevance of the typical sound recording and offers a rare
window into the on-the-ground economics of a major content industry. As political
debates about the appropriate term of copyright continue to roil in the international
arena, empirical evidence provides an important, but inexplicably rare, check: Our findings suggest that current copyright terms are at odds with the economic reality of the
majority of commercially recorded music.

References
Arrow, Kenneth (1962) “Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention,” in R.
Nelson, ed., The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity: Economic and Social Factors. Princeton,
NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 609.
Barnett, Jonathan (2014) “Copyright Without Creators,” 9(3) Rev. of Law & Economics 389–438.
Biasi, Barbara, & Petra Moser (forthcoming) “Effects of Copyright on Science: Evidence from the
WWII Book Republication Program,” American Economic J.: Microeconomics.
Bracha, Oren, & Talha Syed (2014) “Beyond the Incentive-Access Paradigm? Product Differentiation & Copyright Revisited,” 92 Texas Law Rev. 1841–1920.
Buccafusco, Christopher (2007) “On the Legal Consequences of Sauces: Should Thomas Keller’s
Recipes Be Per Se Copyrightable?” 24 Cardozo Arts & Entertainment Law J. 1121–1156.
Buccafusco, Christopher, Zachary C. Burns, Jeanne C. Fromer, & Christopher Jon Sprigman (2014)
“Experimental Tests of Intellectual Property Laws’ Creativity Thresholds,” 93 Texas Law Rev
1921–1980.
Buccafusco, Christopher, & Paul J. Heald (2013) “Do Bad Things Happen When Works Enter the
Public Domain?: Empirical Tests of Copyright Term Extension,” 28(1) Berkeley Technology Law J.
1–44.
Cameron, Colin A., & Pravin K. Travedi (1998) Regression Analysis of Count Data. 1st ed. Cambridge:
Cambridge Univ. Press.
Cliff, Aimee (2019) “Pop’s Need for Speed:‘You Have to Drop New Stuff Constantly,” September
19 Guardian. Available at https://perma.cc/FG92-BB79.
DiCola, Peter (2013) “Money from Music: Survey Evidence on Musicians’ Revenue and Lessons
About Copyright Incentives,” 55 Arizona Law Rev 301–370.
Didwania, Stephanie Holmes (2018) “Copyright Protection and Cumulative Creation: Evidence from
Early Twentieth-Century Music,” 47(2) J. of Legal Studies 235–268.
Elberse, Anita, & Felix Oberholzer-Gee (2007) “Superstars and Underdogs: An Examination of the
Long Tail Phenomenon in Video Sales,” Harvard Business School Working Paper No. 07-015.
Garcı́a, Kristelia (2020) “Contracts and Copyright: Contemporary Musician Income Streams,” in,
Oxford Handbook of Music Law and Policy. Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press.

Copyright and Economic Viability

717

Garcı́a, Kristelia, & Justin McCrary (2019) “A Reconsideration of Copyright’s Term,” 71(2) Alabama
Law Rev 351–406.
Geist, Michael (2018) From Copyright Term to Super Bowl Commercials: Breaking Down the Digital NAFTA
Deal. Available at https://perma.cc/J2UH-REMJ.
Giorcelli, Michela, & Petra Moser (2020)“Copyright and Creativity: Evidence from Italian Operas,
128(11) J. of Political Economy.
Hausman, Jerry, Bronwyn Hall, & Zvi Griliches (1984) “Econometric Models for Count Data with an
Application to the Patents-R & D Relationship,” 52(4) Econometrica 909–938.
Heald, Paul J. (2008) “Property Rights and the Efficient Exploitation of Copyrighted Works: An
Empirical Analysis of Public Domain and Copyrighted Fiction Bestsellers,” 93 Minnesota Law
Rev. 1031–1063.
(2014) “How Copyright Keeps Works Disappeared,” 11(4) J. of Empirical Legal Studies
829–866.
(2019) “The Effect of Copyright Term Length on South African Book Markets (With Reference to the Google Book Project),” 7(1) South African Intellectual Property Law J. 71–98.
Heller, Michael (2010) The Gridlock Economy: How Too Much Ownership Wrecks Markets, Stops Innovation,
and Costs Lives. New York, NY: Basic Books.
Landes, William M., & Richard A. Posner (2003) “Indefinitely Renewable Copyright,” 70(2) Univ. of
Chicago Law Rev 471–518.
Li, Xing, Megan MacGarvie, & Petra Moser (2018) “Dead Poets’ Property: How Does Copyright Influence Price?” 49(1) RAND J. of Economics 181–205.
MacGarvie, Megan, John McKeon, & Jeremy Watson (2018) “It Was Fifty Years Ago Today: Recording
Copyright Term and the Supply of Music,” Working Paper. http://jwatson.me/MMW.pdf
Nordhaus, William D. (1967) “The Optimal Life of a Patent,” Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
241, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
Raustiala, Kal, & Christopher Sprigman (2006) “The Piracy Paradox: Innovation and Intellectual
Property in Fashion Design,” 92(8) Virginia Law Rev. 1687–1777.
Reese, R. Anthony (2012) “What Copyright Owes the Future,” 50(2) Houston Law Rev. 287–318.
Reimers, Imke (2019) “Copyright and Generic Entry in Book Publishing,” 11(3) American Economic J.:
Microeconomics 257–284.
Rosen, Sherwin (1981) “The Economics of Superstars,” 71(5) American Economic Rev. 845–858.
Scotchmer, Suzanne (2004) Innovation and Incentives. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Silbey, Jessica (2014) The Eureka Myth: Creators, Innovators, and Everyday Intellectual Property. Palo Alto,
CA: Stanford Univ. Press.
Soloveichik, Rachel (2013) Music Originals as a Capital Asset. Washington, DC: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis.
Sprigman, Christopher Jon (2017) “Copyright and Creative Incentives: What We Know (And
Don’t),” 55(2) Houston Law Rev. 451–478.
Varian, Hal (2005) “Copying and Copyright,” 19(2) J. of Economic Perspectives 121–138.
Waldfogel, Joel (2012) “Copyright Protection, Technological Change, and the Quality of New Products: Evidence from Recorded Music Since Napster,” 55(4) J. of Law & Economics 715–740.
Wooldridge, Jeffrey M. (1999) “Distribution-Free Estimation of Some Nonlinear Panel Data Models,”
90(1) J. of Econometrics 77–97.
(2002) Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data. 2d ed. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

718

Garcı́a et al.

APPENDIX
A. Model Selection
Appendix Tables A1 and A2 present comparisons of the base model for pooled Poisson,
negative binomial (NB2), and fixed effect Poisson estimators. We show both our base
model and a model that includes an interaction for RIAA certification (as calculated in
Section V.A). The three estimates are substantively similar.
Table A1:

Comparison of Estimators with Album-Level Track Sales Data
Base Model
(1)
Poisson

Week
sqrt(Week)
Blockbuster

0.01
(5.97)
−0.30
(−13.06)
—

(2)
NB2
0.01
(7.17)
−0.30
(−12.57)
—

Blockbuster Interaction
(3)
FEP
0.01
(6.26)
−0.30
(−12.84)
—

Blockbuster × Week

—

—

—

Blockbuster ×
sqrt(Week)
Lnalpha

—

—

—

—

—

Observations

211,706

1.12
(31.14)
211,706

211,705

(4)
Poisson

(5)
NB2

0.01
(5.43)
−0.28
(−12.23)
2.97
(14.67)
−0.00
(−0.44)
−0.02
(−0.58)
—
211,706

0.00
(4.96)
−0.24
(−12.77)
3.11
(12.20)
0.00
(0.67)
−0.07
(−1.31)
0.79
(21.17)
211,706

(6)
FEP
0.01
(5.39)
−0.27
(−12.00)
—
−0.00
(−0.16)
−0.03
(−0.90)
—
211,705

NOTE: z-statistics in parentheses. Poisson and negative binomial models include release-year fixed effects. Standard
errors clustered at the album level.

Table A2: Comparison of Estimators with Album-Level Track Streaming Data,
2015–2017
Base Model
(1)
Poisson
Week
sqrt(Week)
Blockbuster

0.01
(2.20)
−0.28
(−4.49)
—

(2)
NB2
0.01
(1.32)
−0.22
(−4.30)
—

Blockbuster Interaction
(3)
FEP
0.01
(1.53)
−0.26
(−4.59)
—

Blockbuster × Week

—

—

—

Blockbuster ×
sqrt(Week)
lnalpha

—

—

—

—

—

Observations

23,253

1.03
(18.3)
23,253

23,252

(4)
Poisson
0.02
(3.09)
−0.37
(−4.45)
2.66
(9.65)
−0.01
(−1.41)
0.10
(0.90)
—
23,253

(5)
NB2
0.00
(1.04)
−0.21
(−3.96)
2.82
(10.76)
−0.00
(−0.50)
−0.00
(−0.01)
0.67
(10.34)
23,253

(6)
FEP
0.01
(1.69)
−0.23
(−4.78)
0.00
(.)
0.00
(0.11)
−0.04
(−0.46)
—
23,252

NOTE: z-statistics in parentheses. Poisson and negative binomial models include release-year fixed effects. Standard
errors clustered at the album level.
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B. Robustness Checks
1. Varying the Study Period for Track Sales

Figure A1:
periods.

Comparison of track-sales depreciation rates with longer and shorter study

2. Offset Measure for Streams
Figure A2 shows the effect of failing to include a measure of exposure in the streaming
analysis. The blue curve shows predictions for unadjusted counts; the red curve is our
base model (normalized by total streams). The difference between the two estimates
reflects the underlying secular trend caused by explosive growth in the streaming subscriber base throughout our study window.
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Figure A2: Comparison of streaming rates with exposure measure.

3. Windowing Effects
It is standard industry practice to release one or more “lead singles” ahead of the release
of a full album or EP. This is typically done one to two months in advance of an album’s
release date, and usually includes a marketing plan that combines digital downloads, terrestrial and digital radio plays, and streaming availability.
Our main analysis—which begins the calculation of commercial viability at the
release date of the album—does not consider sales and streams in the prerelease period.
To the extent that our sample includes albums with many lead singles, this may understate the commercial viability of the works. To check that our results are robust to this
prerelease period, Figure A3 repeats the main analysis on periods beginning two, four,
and eight weeks prior to the album release date. The results are substantively similar.
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Figure A3:
release.
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Effect on sales depreciation of starting the observation window prior to album

4. Blockbuster Measure

Table A3: Comparison of Synthetic “Top-Selling” Indicator With and Without SpanishLanguage Music
Dependent Variable: Weekly Track Sales

Week
sqrt(Week)
Blockbuster × Week
Blockbuster × sqrt(Week)
Observations

(1)
Full RIAA Measure

(2)
Non-Latin Subset

0.006 (5.390)
−0.271 (−12.00)
−0.000 (−0.16)
−0.033 (−0.90)
211,705

0.006 (5.520)
−0.269 (−12.41)
−0.000 (−0.09)
−0.037 (−1.00)
211,705

NOTE: z-statistics in parentheses with standard errors clustered at the album level. Includes album-level fixed
effects.

